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Abstract
There has been increasing interest in the potential of blockchain in enhanc-
ing the security of devices and systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT).
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based IoT security architecture,
IoTchain. The three-tier architecture comprises an authentication layer, a
blockchain layer and an application layer, and is designed to achieve iden-
tity authentication, access control, privacy protection, lightweight feature,
regional node fault tolerance, denial-of-service resilience, and storage in-
tegrity. We also evaluate the performance of IoTchain to demonstrate its
utility in an IoT deployment.
Keywords: IoT, blockchain, security
1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded devices are fast becoming a norm in our
society for both civilian application (e.g. smart cities and smart homes) and
military application (e.g. Internet of Battlefield Things and Internet of Military
Things) [1, 2, 3, 4]. Similar to other popular information and communications
technologies, security and privacy issues are two key considerations and these
are active and ongoing research areas. For example, Qi Jing et al. [5] surveyed
cross-layer heterogeneous integration challenges associated with IoT systems.
Weber [6] also briefly described several security and privacy properties that
should be considered in an IoT system, namely: resilience to denial of service
(DoS) attacks, data authentication, access control and client privacy. There
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have also been other surveys and reviews on different aspects of IoT security
and privacy, such as [7, 8, 9].
There has been recent interest in the use of blockchain in achieving security
and privacy properties more efficiently.
Since the introduction of blockchain in the paper entitled ’Bitcoin: A Peer-
to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ [10] to solve the double-spending problem in
2008, blockchain has opened the door to many opportunities far beyond the
initial application as a foundational element of digital currencies [11]. Specifi-
cally, blockchain technology has the properties of being completely distributed,
autonomous, restricted to following contractual code and being trackable.
1. Distributed: Each node can obtain all blocks in the chain simply by con-
necting to the neighboring node. Therefore, everyone in the network has
a copy of the blockchain. The public distribution of the complete, in-
tact blockchain also precludes any attempt to defraud or contaminate the
transaction through the mechanisms of double spending or replaying a
duplicate transaction.
2. Autonomous: Blockchain network system is an open platform that anyone
can participate in the blockchain network without registration or being
authenticated to serve as a node, and/or withdraw from the network at
will.
3. Contractual: All nodes should act in accordance to the rule to reach a
consensus.
4. Trackable: This property is useful in that any transaction is immutable
and cannot be altered once the transaction has been completed and added
to the blockchain.
However, blockchain implementation can be resource-consuming (e.g. high
bandwidth and delays) and hence may not be suited for IoT applications [12, 13].
A blockchain-based IoT update operation to achieve improved availability and
accountability was proposed in [14]. However, blockchain was only used during
the update of device software. We posit that blockchain could play a more
significant role in IoT security and privacy solutions.
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based architecture for IoT security
(hereafter referred to as IoTchain). There are three tiers in the proposed archi-
tecture, namely: authentication layer, blockchain layer, and application layer.
The architecture is designed to achieve identity authentication, access control,
privacy protection, lightweight feature, fault tolerance, DoS attack resilience,
and storage integrity, without incurring high overheads and delays.
In the next section, we will present the background materials. In Section 3,
we present our proposed architecture. The core protocols, building blocks of the
architecture, are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the analysis
and evaluation of the proposal. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the hardware security module (HSM), Merkle
tree and security properties.
2.1 Hardware security module
HSM is a dedicated encryption processor designed specifically to protect the
encryption key (i.e. manages, processes, and saves encryption keys safely in
reliable and tamper-resistant devices) [15]. Each module contains one or more
secure cryptoprocessor chips [16] to prevent tampering and bus probing. Many
HSM systems also have the means to securely backup keys that they handle,
either in a wrapped form via the computer operating system or externally us-
ing a smartcard or some other security token. For example, in a public key
infrastructure (PKI) environment, certification authorities and registration au-
thorities may use HSMs to generate, store, and handle key pairs.
2.2 Merkle tree
Merkle tree is also known as the hash tree which stores hash values [17, 18].
Merkle tree has been used in Bitcoin [10], where the leaves are hash values of
data blocks (such as files) and a non-leaf node is the hash of its corresponding
child node concatenation string.
Merkle tree is also used for comparison and verification, as it significantly
reduces the amount of data needed to be transferred and the computational
complexity when dealing with matching or validated application scenarios, es-
pecially in a distributed environment.
Figure 1 is an example of a merkle tree. Each leaf node has the authen-
tication path information, and the four leaf nodes are the hash values of the
respective transactions. The internal nodes are generated from child nodes,
such as Hab = Hash(Ha +Hb), and merkle root = Habcd = Hash(Hab +Hcd).
Each leaf node can be verified via the merkle root and the authentication path
information. Verifier always keeps merkle root. Prover wants to prove to verifier
that Txa really exists, it only needs to send merkle root Habcd, API (Hb, Hcd)
and Txa to verifier, and then the verifier calculates Hab = Hash(Ha +Hb) and
Habcd = Hash(Hab +Hcd). Verifier compares the calculated merkle root with
the merkle root saved by himself, if they are equal, the verifier acknowledges
the transaction does exist.
2.3 Security properties
Based on existing research [13, 14, 12, 19], the following security properties that
are particularly relevant for IoT systems are as follows.
DoS attack resilience. DoS attacks, also known as flood attacks, attempt to
exhaust the available resources of targeted networks or systems (including IoT
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Figure 1: Merkle tree structure
systems), which resulting in the disruption of the targeted service(s) [20, 21, 22,
23]. In other words, such attacks typically affect availability in the conventional
CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad. For example, an external
attacker can launch DoS attacks to attack an intermediary IoT node (e.g. the
regional node in our proposed architecture - see Section 3) to paralyze the
blockchain network.
Malicious regional node attack resilience. Certain IoT nodes, such as
regional nodes in our proposed architecture, may be under the control of a
third party. Such nodes may be malicious, in the sense that these nodes may
attempt to insert malicious transactions or modify existing transactions. For
example, an attacker may wish to allow malicious IoT devices to collect and
send information to another device under the control of the attacker, without
the user’s knowledge (e.g. a smart TV to collect sound and videos without the
authorization of the owner).
Identity forgery attack resilience. An attacker may forge the signature of
the device in order to successfully construct a malicious transaction to facilitate
other malicious activities (e.g. data exfiltration such as those discussed in [24,
25, 26]).
Malicious cloud service provider attack resilience. Malicious cloud ser-
vice providers (or their employees) may process the stored data without permis-
sion, such as addition, deletion or modification. Also, a malicious cloud service
provider may intentionally calculate the wrong result for the requester.
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Malicious manufacturer attack resilience. The IoT manufacturer may
insert backdoors in devices (also known as hardware Trojans) or software for
malicious purpose.
3 Proposed architecture
We will now introduce our proposed IoTchain architecture, as depicted in Fig-
ures 2 and 3. For the remaining of this paper, we will denote the certification
center as CC, detection center as DC, regional node as RN, manufacturer as M
and device as D. The interactive information flow is referred to as transaction,
so as to be consistent with the Bitcoin protocol.
The certification layer is where the certification center and the detection
center are located. In practice, both centers can be the same physical entity.
• The certification center certifies the manufacturer and the regional center,
which is conceptually similar to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
allocating IP addresses. It has its own key pair (pkcc, skcc).
• The detection center is used to detect malicious behaviors. For exam-
ple, the detection center can detect whether the software update/patch
released by the manufacturer is secure (e.g. in the event that update is
injected by a third party), or whether the cloud service provider modifies
the data uploaded by the device.
In the application layer, we have regional nodes that are conceptually similar
to a miner in Bitcoin. The regional node is also responsible for the management
of devices in the entire region and has significant computing power and storage
capacities. The regional node has a public/private key pair (pkrn, skrn). The
consensus algorithm between regional nodes is based on the actual demand,
and it should be sufficiently lightweight (unlike to energy-consuming consensus
mechanism in [10]). One candidate we consider in IoTchain is the Byzantine
fault-tolerant algorithm and more specifically, the Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance algorithm (PBFT) [27]. The PBFT algorithm is used in Fabric [28],
and has a 1/3 node-level fault tolerance. Other potential consensus mechanisms
include proof-of-stake [29]. In other words, any efficient and lightweight con-
sensus algorithm can be used in IoTchain, based on the actual needs. The RN
stores a range of transactional information. In addition to storing the public
key information of the certified manufacturers and other regional nodes, each
regional node maintains four tables, namely:
• The registry table includes device’s registration information.
• The update table includes the update information from the manufacturer.
• The permissions table includes permission release information.
• The storage information table stores the data of the device storage infor-
mation.
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Figure 2: Architecture of IoTchain
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Figure 3: Hierarchical structure of IoTchain
The blockchain layer provides blockchain services in the IoT implementation.
Specifically, it accepts transactional information from the application layer, and
provides two modes for the user to choose. This will be discussed further in
Section 4.
• The service usage layer uses the services provided by the service provider
layer.
– Users use IoT devices for various purpose, such as healthcare related
(e.g. heart rate measurement and step counts), and these devices
may need to be registered with a regional network (e.g. a regional
clinic or hospital).
– Let the device number be denoted as i, and each device has a pub-
lic/private key pair (pkdi , skdi). The manufacturer generates the de-
vice’s certificate certdi = (pk
di , signmj(pk
di)), where Signmj(pk
di)
is the signature of pkdi signed using the private key Mj . The man-
ufacturer then writes tuple = (pkdi , skdi , certdi) on the HSM during
the manufacturing stage.
• The service provider layer provides local storage service and cloud service
to devices. In order for efficient storage, the device can store the data in
local storage (i.e. does not involve the blockchain network). The device
can also store the data in the cloud, based on demand. Let the man-
ufacturer number be denoted as j, and the manufacturer produces the
IoT devices and perform the necessary authentication operation for the
devices. In our proposed IoTchain, there are multiple competing manu-
facturers, M={m1, ...,mm}, where m is the number of manufacturers, and
the public and private keys of Mj are pk
mj , skm
j
respectively.
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4 Core protocols
In this section, we will describe the core protocols in our IoTchain architecture,
namely: registration and cancellation transactions, update release and query
transactions, device storage transactions, permission release and request trans-
actions, and local interactive transactions. Transactions that are not written to
the blockchain network directly will be processed via the merkle tree to construct
a local transaction (see Section 4.5).
4.1 Registration and cancellation transaction
All entities in IoTchain need to be authenticated. Thus, we now describe the
registration and cancellation transaction protocol.
For manufacturer and regional node: Both manufacturer and regional node
generate a registration request and send the registration request to a certifi-
cation center. Then, the certification center reviews to determine whether the
registration request meets the requirement. If it does, then the corresponding
key pair is sent back to the applicant and the registration transaction will be
generated by the certification center. Then, the certification center will send this
to the blockchain network. Upon confirmation, the entire registration process
is completed – see Figure 4.
For device: During manufacturing, tuple = (pkdi , skdi , certdi) is written on
the HSM to prevent attackers from tampering with information. The structure
of registration transactions for device is shown in Table 1, which will be sent by
the device to the regional network to complete the registration.
For cloud service provider: The cloud service provider sends a registration
request to the regional network, and obtains the authentication released by the
regional network. Then, the regional network writes the transaction into the
registry table.
All the above-mentioned transactions are for registrations. When it comes
to cancellation, a typical case is that an entity will be removed from the system
once the validity period expires. Another event for cancellation is when the
detection center detects a malicious regional node or manufacturer. When this
happens, the detection center will construct a cancellation transaction to remove
the malicious regional node or manufacturer.
Types
Registration transaction
Related description
information
Public key
information
Signature
Registration Version number,
manufacturer etc.
pkdi Signmj
Table 1: The structure of a registration transaction
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4.2 Update release and query transactions
This protocol allows the manufacturer to apply security or software updates
(patches), and these update release and query transactions are via blockchain.
Update release transaction IoTchain offers two ways.
1. When a manufacturer wishes to apply a software update to large-scale
regions or globally, then the update transaction should be issued directly
to the blockchain network. The regional node generates an update table
for the respective devices. The structure of a update release transaction
is shown in Table 2, and the process is shown in Figure 5.
2. If the device update is limited to some region(s), then the update transac-
tion is sent to the specific regional node where devices need to be updated.
This can result in reduced overheads in the network.
Update query transaction The device can periodically construct an update
query transaction to ask whether an update is required. The regional node
searches the update table to find the answer. If it exists, then it transfers the
update contents to the device. The device will verify the transaction signature,
and if the signature is correct and the data is complete, then the device will be
updated.
Update detection The detection center will carry out malicious code detec-
tion of the device update contents in the blockchain layer. If malicious codes
are identified, then the detection center will contact the corresponding manufac-
turer for further investigation, and if necessary, the detection center can cancel
the certification of the malicious manufacturer.
Types
Update release transaction
Manufacturer Device serial
number
Update
content
Manufacturer
signature
Update
release
Texas
Instruments
DA877D
54RWFT
- Sign all of the
previous items
Signmj
Table 2: The structure of a update release transaction globally
4.3 Device storage transaction
When the built-in storage capacity of device is not sufficient and more data
needs to be stored, then the data will be uploaded to a local regional storage
node or cloud service provider.
Upload to local storage The device uploads data directly to the local re-
gional storage node.
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Figure 5: The process of a update release transaction
Upload to cloud service providers The device uploads data to the cloud
service providers directly, generates the hash of data, and constructs the storage
information transactions. The device will also use its own private key skdi to
sign this transaction and send it to the blockchain network. After the blockchain
network has confirmed receipt, the cloud service provider stores the data. The
cloud service provider not only has the storage capacity, but it also has the
ability to analyze and process the outsourced data. The structure of the device
storage transaction to the cloud service provider is shown in Table 3, and the
process is shown in Figure 6.
Types
Device storage transaction
Device
number
Data
number
Hash of
data
Data
processing
methods
(optional)
Signature
Device
storage
pkdi 137198 Hash
value
- Decive’s
signature
Signdi
Table 3: The structure of a device storage transaction
4.4 Permission release and request transactions
In our proposed IoTchain, we also consider access control. For example, a user’s
wearable device wishes to access some services (e.g. opens the door), the device
will invoke the permission release transactions. For explanation, we assume that
the user has two devices D1, D2 and wishes D1 to obtain access to D2.
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Figure 6: The process of a device storage transaction
Permission release transaction
1. Permission release between devices in the same region: users can use device
identification number to set the access rights of the two devices in the
regional node, and add the permission content in the permission table.
2. Permission release between devices in different regional nodes: first, the
regional node RN1 generates the permission transaction and signs it, then
RN1 sends it to RN2. RN2 signs it and sends it to the blockchain network.
The structure of permission release transaction is shown in Table 4.
Permission request transaction
1. Permission request between devices in the same region: locally, D1 con-
structs permission request transaction and sends it to the regional node.
The regional node queries its permission table. If they align with each
other, then D1 is allowed to access D2 and both D1 and D2 will be as-
signed with a shared symmetric key for communication.
2. Permission request between devices in different regional nodes: D1 con-
structs permission request transaction and sends it to its regional node.
Then, the regional node queries its own permission table and checks whether
the request device D2 is in the region under RN2. If so, RN1 signs the
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request transaction and sends it to RN2. Upon confirmation of RN2 and
the signature with skrn2 verifies, then the permission request transaction
will be published to the blockchain network. The communication key will
also be generated. Once D1 and D2 receive the key, they establish their
communication and use the key to encrypt future data transmission. The
request process from D1 to D2 is shown in Figure 7.
When D1 needs to request local storage and cloud service, it needs to obtain
the hash value of the required data from the blockchain network to ensure
integrity. The steps are the same as the process in requesting of device data.
Types
Permission release transacion
Device
D1
Device
D2
Types of operation
(read/write/revise/
query/real-time read)
Signature
Permission
release
pkd1 pkd2 Read Signatures of the
previous items signed
by skrn1 , skrn2
Table 4: The structure of a permission release transacion
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4.5 Local interactive transaction
Based on the IoTchain architecture and the above discussed transactions, it is
clear which transactions are directly written into the blockchain network and
which transactions are written into the merkle tree first – see also Table 5.
For transactions that do need to be sent to the blockchain network directly,
the regional node will compute the hash value as the leaf nodes of the transaction
in order to construct a merkle tree. The regional node uses the merkle root to
construct a local interactive transaction, and publishes it into the blockchain
network. Meanwhile, it will return the authentication path information to the
applicant who requests the leaf node transaction.
Once the transaction applicants wish to confirm the completed transactions,
the task can be achieved easily by using the authentication path information
and the merkle root value. If the value computed by verifier matches with the
merkle root value stored locally, then this indicates the existence of the local
transaction.
Written into the blockchain net-
work directly
Written into the blockchain net-
work via merkle tree
Registration transaction of manufac-
turer and regional node
Registration transaction of device
and cloud service providers
Update release transaction (global re-
gion device update)
Update release transactions (partial
region device update)
Device stores transaction to cloud ser-
vice provider
Update query transaction
Permission release transaction ( D1,
D2 belong to different regions)
Permission release transaction ( D1,
D2 belong to same region)
Permission request transaction ( D1,
D2 belong to different regions)
Access request transaction ( D1, D2
belong to same region)
Table 5: Transaction classification
5 Security analysis and performance evaluation
This section presents the security analysis and performance evaluation of our
proposal.
5.1 Security analysis
We will now explain how our proposal achieves the security properties described
in Section 2.3.
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DoS attacks. DoS attacks in the blockchain layer cannot succeed due to the
distributed structure of blockchain. The blockchain has no single point of failure
problem.
Malicious regional node attacks. The regional nodes wish to add malicious
transactions to the blockchain network. Such an attack will not be successful
because the signature cannot be forged assuming the security of the underlying
digital signature algorithm. When a regional node is always rejecting normal
(i.e. non malicious) transactions, then the user can report it to the detection
center after discovering the situation. Upon investigation, the detection center
may decide to cancel the certification of the misbehaving regional node.
Identity forgery attacks. An external attacker wishes to use a fabricated
signature of a device to construct a transaction. Similarly, due to the use of
a secure digital signature algorithm, such an attack will not work. Another
possibility is to create a device with malicious codes. However, such a device
will not be registered in advance by the manufacturers; thus, devices produced
by an attacker will not be able to obtain a legitimate public and private key
pair.
Malicious cloud service provider attacks. Malicious cloud service provider
may perform unauthorized operations over the stored data, such as adding,
deleting, modifying and querying. A user can perform a hash value comparison
(i.e. compare the hash of the data stored by the cloud service provider with the
hash value stored in the blockchain network). In other words, data modification
can be easily detected.
Malicious manufacturer attacks. Manufacturers can include a back door
in the device or software, for nefarious purpose. We assume that a compe-
tent detection center will diligently check the software updates published in the
blockchain network to identify such back doors or vulnerabilities. Once de-
tected, the certification center will withdraw the qualification of the particular
manufacturer and revoke the corresponding public and private key pair.
5.2 Property analysis
We will now discuss the properties of IoTchain (also see Table 6).
Identity authentication. [30] Entities in IoTchain should have their own
public/private key pairs. If either party (e.g. manufacturer or regional node)
misbehaves, then the detection center can cancel their qualification by issuing a
cancellation transaction. The device has a built-in public and private key, and
the public key represents its identity. Thus, IoTchain guarantees the identity of
the entity.
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Access control. [31] The process of releasing and requesting permission was
discussed in Section 4.4. The permission table maintained by the regional node
provides fine-grained access control for users and devices.
Privacy protection. Blockchain provides a global transparent service. Thus,
the privacy of Iotchain system cannot be guaranteed. However, it can be solved
by the use of merkle tree, in the sense that the data that are meant to be
private will not be sent to blockchain directly. In other words, IoTchain offers
two modes to handle transactions.
1. Primitive mode: Regional nodes receive a range of transaction information
and put them into blockchain network directly. The associated limitation
is the demands imposed on the communication, although the transaction
information is globally visible, tamper-resistant and its distributed storage
cannot be affected by a single point failure. The latter three characteristics
are probably why blockchain are being currently explored for a wide range
of applications.
2. Merkle mode: Regional nodes save the received transaction information
locally. After all the data have been processed by the merkle tree, the
regional node publishes the root of the merkle tree to the blockchain net-
work. A key disadvantage is that function is concentrated in the regional
node (i.e. potentially a single point of failure), and if the information
is lost, then all information will be lost (i.e. no redundancy). The key
advantage is in its privacy protection, in the sense that the transaction
information is seen only by the regional node.
Lightweight feature. IoTchain takes the IoT device’s constraints (i.e. com-
puting power and bandwidth capacity) into account and places the most com-
putationally and storage intensive activities at the blockchain layer. Ordinary
device only needs to perform lightweight transactions, as IoTchain transfers a
large number of sensor tasks to the regional nodes; thus, providing an alternative
transaction mode and enabling lightweightness.
Regional node fault tolerance. IoTchain allows different consensus algo-
rithms to be used (e.g. plug-and-play) to meet the needs of the market at any
one time. For example, we discussed the use of the PBFT algorithm because it
can support 1/3 of the nodes’ fault tolerance. Thus, IoTchian has a high fault
tolerance. Other fault tolerance consensus mechanisms can also be deployed
according to specific requirements.
DoS resilience. Although we cannot prevent an attacker from targeting the
manufacturers (or any systems and entities, including government and national
security agencies), once the manufacturer uploads the update transaction to the
blockchain network, the update contents are DoS resilience (due to the inherent
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property of blockchain). In other words, any attacker cannot prevent the device
from obtaining updated content from the blockchain network.
Storage integrity guarantee. Device publishes the hash of the data to
blockchain network. The hash value in blockchain cannot be tampered due
to the tamper-resistant characteristics. Thus, anyone can check whether the
information stored in the cloud server is complete. The local memory is stored
locally, so its integrity is guaranteed.
Properties Description
Identity authentication CC issues registration transactions
Access Control it confirmed by the permission table
in IoTchain
Privacy protection IoTchain provides local interactive
transactions
Lightweight feature IoTchain puts the most computation
and storage work to the blockchain
layer
Regional node fault tolerance the consensus algorithm is
pluggable, such as PBFT that
supports 1/3 node fault tolerance
Update anti-DoS update contents are sent to the
blockchain network
Storage integrity guarantee IoTchain uses the hash of data to
guarantee integrity
Table 6: IoTchain property analysis
5.3 Performance evaluation
In this section, we simulate the communications between device and regional
node, and between regional nodes in the blockchain layer.
5.3.1 Communications between device and regional node
We built a network of IoTchain environment based on contiki 2.7 [32]. We
constructed six Z1 mote nodes generated at random locations and assumed that
one of the nodes is a regional node. The nodes used IPV6 over low power wireless
personal regional networks (6LoWPAN) to connect with each other, typical of
resource constrained wireless sensor networks. In this simulation/evaluation,
we only considered the communication process (i.e. computation and storage
procedures were not considered).
We also assumed the use of the elliptic curve signature algorithm [33] in our
scheme, and thus, we used 72 bytes for the signature sizes in the simulations.
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The hash function is SHA-256 [34] in the simulation, so the hash of data is 32
bytes.
The size of the registration transaction takes types, description, public key
information and signature into account, and adds up to a total of 79 bytes.
The update release transaction takes 77 bytes without the update data. The
update query transaction is 5 bytes which is 72 bytes less than the update release
transaction because of the signature sizes. Permission release transaction needs
10 bytes to offer types, devices information and types of operation. It takes 82
bytes to construct a permission request transaction. The size of each transaction
via the merkle tree is shown in Figure 8.
We used contiki 2.7 to simulate the communicationa between device and RN.
It takes 151 ms for device to perform a registration transaction. Update release
and update query transaction take 147 ms and 81 ms, respectively. Permission
release and request transaction cost 94 ms and 152 ms, respectively. Each
transmission time is shown in Figure 9.
As shown in the simulations, the communication time between device and
the regional node adds 72 bytes of signature, and an additional of 32 bytes of
hash value is required to guarantee security.
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Figure 9: Transmission time of transactions via the merkle tree
5.3.2 Communications between regional nodes
As the regional nodes have more computing power and storage capacity, we used
Fabric [28] to simulate the communications between region nodes.
The size of the registration transaction for the manufacturer or the regional
node is 80 bytes. The update release transaction (partly) takes the same 77 bytes
with global update release transaction. The device storage transaction needs
112 bytes as it contains a hash value of 32 bytes and a signature of 72 bytes.
Permission release and request transaction require 154 bytes each, because they
need two signatures of the regional node. The size of each transaction written
into blockchain directly is shown in Figure 10.
In [35], the authors deployed the IOHeavy smart contract that performs
a number of read and write operations of key-value tuples. They used 20-
byte keys and 100-byte values. This environment is exactly the same as the
communications between the regional nodes in the blockchain layer. The average
time of writing is about 5106 ms and read time is about 8703 ms. It can be
seen that the writing and reading time are not affected by an increase in block
sizes. The simulation is shown in Figure 11.
As shown in the simulations, the transmission times can be realistically
realized in the blockchain layer.
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Figure 10: Transaction size written into blockchain directly
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6 Conclusion
IoT and blockchains are two technological trends that are likely to stay for the
foreseeable future, and blockchain can be used to enhance the security of IoT
systems.
In this paper, we presented a blockchain-based IoT security architecture,
IoTchain. We then demonstrated how this three-tier architecture achieves iden-
tity authentication, access control, privacy protection, lightweight feature, re-
gional node fault tolerance, DoS resilience, and storage integrity. We then
demonstrated that IoTchain traffic is sufficiently low for a real-world deploy-
ment.
Future research will include implementing a prototype of IoTchain in a real-
world environment, such as in the IoT labs of the authors. This will allow us to
empirically evaluate the proposed architecture in a real-world setting.
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